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Community Development and the Politics for Social Welfare: Rethinking 
Redistribution and Recognition Struggles in the United States 
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Abstract 
In this article, we explore the philosophical conflict between, on the one hand, a 
community development politics centered on forming race and gender neutral 
alliances to promote pragmatic economic advance, and on the other, one focused 
on recognising the perspectives and practices of people of colour, women and 
other groups who are often excluded from grassroots movements.  Using the 
United States as an example, we argue that a politics for social welfare is 
essential to create a movement in opposition to the devastating impacts of 
neoliberalism.  Defending and reconstructing the American welfare state 
requires a politics which articulates 1) a theory of justice, 2) an understanding of 
the nature of social reforms, 3) a critical analysis of the state and 4) an 
appreciation of the limits of the welfare state in the context of the political 
economy of advanced capitalism. We conclude with a set of questions which we 
believe practitioners, activists and scholars should address if are to win victories 
while fostering the inclusion, leadership and participation of those groups who 
have been systematically marginalised in community development politics. 
 
Keywords: community development; social welfare; welfare state; social justice; 
citizenship; America  
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Introduction 
For this 50th Anniversary edition of the Community Development Journal, we are 
revisiting a key dilemma that troubles the theory and practice of community 
development in the United States and beyond. Understanding the most effective 
strategies and tactics to advance the social justice claims of different groups is 
hotly contested and disputes often focus on the efficacy of redistribution versus 
recognition struggles (Young 1990; Fraser 1997; Hobson, 2003). In community 
development there is a communicative and practical disconnection between 
those activists advocating pragmatic politics focused on winning tangible 
redistributive victories linked to jobs, housing and education and those activists 
advancing recognition politics who seek to take action on the variety of ways in 
which respect, status and privilege are unequally available to different social 
groups (Alinsky, 1971; Boyte, 1980; DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge, 2009; 
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Emejulu, 2015). These debates do not have to be constructed as binary opposites 
since redistributive struggles are often predicated on the misrecognition and 
erasure of groups based on their race, class, gender and sexuality in public life. 
Nevertheless, when we reflect on the contemporary failures of left-wing politics 
in the United States—in spite of some important but partial reforms under the 
Obama administration after 2009—we see progressive activists disunited 
because of the familiar disputes between redistribution and recognition 
struggles.  This disunity is rooted in competing understandings of the goals, 
strategies and priorities of community development.  
 
For example, a central feature of American community development is the 
enduring appeal of populist politics. Populism, in the US context, is a movement 
which emerged from late 19th century agrarian traditions which focuses on 
combating the power of elites and restoring direct rule and power to ordinary 
people (Kazin, 1998).  Populism, as a political phenomenon, can be seen across 
the political spectrum in the U.S. and has been pulled to both the left and the 
right at different moments in American history.  While left-wing populism 
focuses on reining in corporate excess and the extremes of power and money in 
the political system, right-wing populism has tended to be associated with anti-
intellectual, anti-immigrant and anti-government traditions.  Both populist 
traditions have been reactivated in response to the 2008 economic crisis. 
Examples of right-wing populism include the Tea Party in the US, the Front 
National in France, the United Kingdom Independence Party in Britain and the 
Swedish Democrats in Sweden. Examples of left-wing populism can be seen in 
the presidential campaign of Bernie Sanders in the US, Jeremy Corbyn’s 
successful leadership bid for the Labour Party in Britain and widespread support 
for Podemos in Spain and the 2015 election of Syriza-led governments in Greece. 
 
For some political actors in community development, left-wing populism is the 
rational and pragmatic choice for policymakers and grassroots activists wanting 
to advance equality and social justice (Boyte 1980; Scanlon 2001). Given the 
entrenched everyday and institutionalised racism and sexism in American 
society some left-wing populists argue that actions derived from explicitly anti-
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racist and/or feminist politics are doomed to failure as these positions fracture 
rather than unite social movements for equality and justice (Gitlin 1995; Scanlon 
2001). Proponents of left-wing populism, who seek to unite different interest 
groups under the banner of economic justice for all, argue that it is the logical 
choice for those serious about advancing social justice. A focus on economic 
justice—which explicitly eschews the politics of race and gender—has the ability 
to sidestep the controversies surrounding identity politics and focus instead on a 
core issue that the vast majority of Americans experience: economic inequality 
(Stiglitz 2013). This argument is compelling particularly when assessing the 
success of progressive populist movements for increasing the minimum wage at 
the city, state and federal levels. These movements, such as the Fight for $15 
campaign for a $15 dollar minimum wage, have won widespread support  
precisely because they are presented as ‘race and gender free’ propositions to 
policymakers and the American public. Advocates of left-wing populism 
strategically focus on ‘fairness in pay’ as a backdoor means of addressing racial 
and gender inequalities since increases in the minimum wage disproportionately 
benefit people of colour and women (and women of colour in particular) because 
these groups are typically over-concentrated in low-skilled, low waged 
employment. In these uncertain economic times, a populist message has 
captured the zeitgeist and helped to shape party politics and policymaking in 
ways that seem to perpetually elude anti-racist and feminist campaigners. 
 
However, when we look more closely at the politics of left-wing populism, deeply 
problematic practices are evident. Both left-wing and right-wing populist politics 
actively exclude discussions of race and gender, making it extremely difficult for 
activists to make social justice claims that advance perspectives linked to race, 
class, gender, sexuality and disability (Emejulu, 2011, 2015; Pride and Morrison 
2015). At the expense of people of colour and women (and women of colour in 
particular) populist politics secures legitimacy by silencing the voices and 
experiences of those in the most precarious social and economic positions. Thus 
there is a serious question here about the ethics of adopting an exclusionary 
politics in the very name of those groups populist activists seek to support. 
Surely it is better to focus on the political education of grassroots activists so that 
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feminist, anti-racist and class politics can be interwoven into the very fabric of 
progressive political action. Understanding and addressing interlocking 
experiences of oppression linked to race, class, gender, sexuality and disability is 
a central concern of an intersectional politics (Combahee River Collective 1976; 
Crenshaw 1991; Yuval Davis, 2006; Bilge 2013). 
 
For example, the #BlackLivesMatters movement is an important riposte to the 
de-raced and de-gendered left-wing populist agenda. The movement was 
founded in 2012 by three Black Queer women—Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors and 
Opal Tometi—in the wake of the murder of Trayvon Martin by a neighborhood 
security guard, George Zimmerman, who was subsequently acquitted of criminal 
charges at a closely watched trial. #BlackLivesMatters seeks to dismantle anti-
Black racism that systematically terrorizes and marginalises Black women and 
men (Garza 2014). This movement takes an explicitly intersectional approach 
whereby ‘Black Lives’ are defined to highlight how the dynamics of race, class, 
gender and sexuality operate in America—and in so called ‘progressive 
movements’—to oppress Black people. #BlackLivesMatters embodies, rather 
than sets aside, an intersectional politics to help build a mass movement for 
Black liberation and social justice. As the protests against the extra-judicial 
killings of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Aiyanna Stanley-Jones, Freddie Gray, 
Rekia Boyd and Sandra Bland demonstrate, marginalised groups continue to be 
organised and mobilized for action by explicitly and intentionally using the 
language of race and gender—and can win popular public support and 
concessions from state actors. Interestingly, the #BlackLivesMatters movement 
also operates as a direct challenge to white progressives (and populists) to join 
the movement for Black liberation by taking seriously anti-Black racism. Thus 
#BlackLivesMatters seeks to build interracial coalitions but on the terms that 
Black activists prioritise—rather than those that will be ‘palatable’ to the 
American public. This is a very different and important alternative strategy and 
politics to coalition building for social justice.  
 
Given these ongoing debates within contemporary politics, how might we move 
beyond these conflicts between redistribution and recognition? How might we 
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begin to refocus efforts on addressing disparities in income, wealth and respect 
between different social groups? In this article, we argue that a ‘politics for social 
welfare’ can be constructed and advanced to unite different types of left-wing 
activists for both redistribution and recognition struggles. By ‘politics for social 
welfare’ we mean analyses and practices that defend and support the expansion 
of the universal redistributive features of the welfare state, whilst 
simultaneously engaging in struggles for the recognition, respect and equal 
participation of marginalized groups in the American polity. We argue that 
community development is an embodiment of social democratic ideals of 
egalitarianism, fairness and justice and activists and practitioners in America can 
renew their politics and perhaps overcome their internal disputes by arguing for, 
rather than running away from, the solidarity politics of social welfare. By 
‘community development’ we mean a ‘political and social process of education 
and action to achieve self-determination and social justice for marginalised 
groups’ (Emejulu 2015: 3). 
 
In a context where individualism and inequality are often portrayed as a 
‘common sense’ part of American life, advancing a politics for social welfare is no 
small endeavor.  Indeed, that governing has virtually ground to a halt in Congress 
and that the majority of the American public think government is broken is a 
major obstacle to a politics for social welfare. However, attempting to practice 
politics on the terms set by neoliberalism and anti-government partisans is not 
working for progressives and those in the most precarious economic 
circumstances. A renewed politics that seeks to reclaim the idea of social welfare 
and the recognition of marginalised groups is crucial at this moment of 
neoliberal hegemony and state violence.  
 
  The article next provides  a short overview of both the formation of the 
American welfare state in the early 20th century and its retrenchment in order to 
understand the on-going tensions between a redistribution and recognition 
politics. We will then move on to discuss the constitutive elements of a politics 
for social welfare and how it might be practiced in contemporary American 
community development. We conclude with a set of questions which we believe 
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practitioners, activists and scholars should address if we are to win victories 
while fostering the inclusion, leadership and participation of those groups who 
have been systematically marginalised in community development politics. 
  
The American Way of Social Welfare: Piecemeal, Incremental and 
Inadequate 
 
Social welfare advocates in the US have long lamented the inadequacy of their 
welfare state, particularly in comparison to those of Western Europe.  Social 
policies and programmes in the US generally lack both the depth of coverage (i.e., 
adequacy) needed to ensure the well-being of individuals and the breadth (i.e., 
universal eligibility) necessary to extend social protection to all residents 
(O’Connor, 1998; Katz, 1989).  What is more, fewer mandates exist which require 
employers to provide benefits such as paid vacation, paid time off for illness 
and/or disability and parental leave.  Esping-Andersen (2013) describes these 
differences as reflecting three competing traditions among welfare states, 
distinguishing liberal, social democratic, and corporatist models.  The US, lacking 
the social democratic and social solidaristic traditions found in much of Europe, 
Esping-Andersen argues, developed along liberal lines, favoring a minimalist 
approach which focuses more on means tested social welfare than upon 
universal programmes. However, we think Esping-Andersen unnecessarily 
downplays the role of institutionalised racism in the shaping of the American 
welfare state. As has been well documented, Americans lack strong social 
solidarity in relation to social welfare because a toxic blend of individualism and 
white supremacy work to undermine the construction of a universal and 
comprehensive social protection system in order to avoid providing a social 
safety net for African Americans and other minority groups (Katz, 1986; 
O’Connor, 1998; Soss, 2000; Katznelson, 2014). 
 
American welfare state formation and expansion occurred during three 
historical periods spanning about sixty years in response to destabilizing 
economic contractions in the mid-19th century. By the early 20th century, these 
crises partly produced and were amplified by foundational changes to American 
society: growing income and wealth inequalities, widespread political 
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corruption, high levels of immigration and urbanization and the development of 
an unregulated industrial workplace (Katz, 1986).  In response to the disruptions 
generated by these social and economic transformations, institutional actors 
conceived of and constructed a limited interventionist state that could regulate 
market fluctuations and reduce absolute poverty in order to stifle social unrest, 
popular protests and maintain political and economic order.   
 
The first important moment of American welfare state formation was during the 
Progressive Era (1890-1920).  During this period, the administrations of both 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson developed federal and state policies 
to reduce social inequalities and protect vulnerable populations (Katz, 1986; 
Skocpol, 1992; McGerr, 2003).  Further welfare state expansion occurred with 
the passage and implementation of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programmes 
(1930-1944), which were in response to the Great Depression. Using Keynesian 
approaches of counter-cyclical state spending, the architects of the New Deal 
spurred consumer demand, expanded federal powers to include the regulation of 
the banking industry, recognised collective bargaining rights for trade unions 
and created systems of retirement security, income maintenance, unemployment 
benefits and workers compensation.  The New Deal provided access to economic 
rights for a large number of white American workers and the unemployed, but 
systematically excluded a large percentage of African American citizens in order 
to placate racist white Southern Democrats and ensure the passage of the New 
Deal reforms in Congress (Katz, 1986; Quadagno, 1994). 
 
During the third period for American welfare state expansion, Lyndon Johnson’s 
administration implemented the Great Society programmes (1963-1968) which 
aimed to expand Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms. This era was distinguished by 
efforts to tackle persistent poverty during an era of sustained economic growth 
and implement reforms in response to the Civil Rights Movement. Key 
programmes include the creation of Medicare and Medicaid, Head Start, Job Corp 
and VISTA, Community Action Programs and expanded food stamp eligibility as 
well as the passage of the Voting and Civil Rights Acts.  Johnson’s War on Poverty 
focused on providing educational and social service benefits to the poor, but also 
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attempted to include them, via community action agencies, in the process of 
developing and administering social services under the famous mantra of 
‘maximum feasible participation’ (Moynihan, 1969; Marris and Rein, 1972). 
 
 Eli Zaretsky (2013) argues that while bureaucratic solutions could have been 
engineered solely by policy elites, the American welfare state was not simply a 
technocratic and managerial response to economic crises and social unrest. At 
each stage of its development, the welfare state was also the product of political 
protest by left-wing activists.  The Progressive Era was shaped by a diverse 
group of social reformers that included feminists, birth control advocates, 
temperance activists, union leaders, social workers, public health advocates, 
populist farmers, and others.  The New Deal was influenced by the demands of 
socialists, early civil rights campaigners and trade unionists. The Great Society 
would not have occurred without the theoretical and pragmatic work 
undertaken by Civil Rights, New Left, and Black trade union activists who had 
laid the groundwork for racial justice claims since early in the 20th century. 
 
By the mid-1970s, America’s experiments with Keynesianism and social welfare 
were starting to falter. First, the debilitating recession caused by the oil embargo 
in the Persian Gulf brought to an abrupt end the unprecedented economic 
growth America had experienced since 1945. In a context of a shrinking 
economic pie, many Americans balked at paying higher taxes on social welfare 
programmes (Diamond, 1995; Katz, 2008). Second, the incipient New Right 
movement, which was incubated in Barry Goldwater’s failed 1964 presidential 
campaign, was growing in strength and gave voice to the so-called ‘silent 
majority’ of white Americans opposed to the social and cultural changes of the 
Civil Rights, New Left and feminist movements and interventionist federal 
initiatives such as addressing de facto residential and school segregation (Fisher, 
1992; Diamond, 1995; Emejulu, 2015). Finally, the ‘New Deal coalition’ was 
starting to fracture. Since the 1930s an uneasy alliance of trade unionists, 
socialists, civil rights activists, social reformers and conservative Democrats had 
comprised the voting bloc for the Democratic Party. By the late 1960s, 
disagreements about the pace and direction of meaningful social change—
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particularly in relation to the state’s role in addressing institutionalised racism in 
American society—split the coalition.   This was seen in debates about issues 
such as affirmative action, school desegregation, and the availability of welfare 
benefits, the last of which was being increasingly racialised (Piven and Cloward, 
1978).   
 
These complex economic, social and political changes helped to usher Ronald 
Reagan into power in 1980, who, in turn, put his Administration to work to 
undermine popular public support for social welfare. For Reagan and the 
broader New Right movement, dismantling many of the New Deal and Great 
Society reforms was justified in the name of individual freedom and personal 
responsibility. Thus key apparatuses of the War on Poverty were abolished. 
Federal funding and support to community development projects were 
dramatically cut or withdrawn completely (Block et al., 1987; O’Connor, 1998). It 
is important to note that specific funding streams for radical social welfare work 
were deliberately targeted by the Reagan administration for defunding. This was 
especially the case for feminist and anti-racist community organising projects 
(Fisher, 1993).  Racially coded attacks were also used to disparage welfare 
recipients which further undermined popular support for the social welfare 
state.  
 
From 1992, Bill Clinton, pursuing the neoliberal policy platform of the ‘New 
Democrats’, continued the assault on social welfare through the privatisation of 
many of social programmes and went further than Reagan by ‘ending welfare as 
we know it’ (Weaver, 2000).  The passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Act ended welfare as an entitlement programme and 
placed a five-year lifetime limit on the receipt of federal welfare payments (Soss, 
2000; Katz 2008).  These harsh reforms under Clinton represent a toxic mix of 
neoliberal restructuring of the social welfare state and the racist justifications for 
cutting entitlements. 
 
The 2008 economic crisis and the subsequent Great Recession have continued to 
erode the social security of low and moderate income Americans, especially 
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African Americans and Latinos, and particularly in states with liberal welfare 
models.  The recession was fueled by the deregulation of the financial services 
industry, the banks’ wide-spread use of supposedly ‘risk free’ financial 
instruments such as ‘credit default swaps’ and the inevitable bursting of the 
subprime mortgage bubble (Blinder, 2013; Roubini, 2011).  In addition to the 
impacts of the recession on employment, savings, and property values, 
conservative policymakers have used the crisis as an opportunity to advance 
austerity measures designed to further roll back the welfare state.  For example, 
conservative politicians at the state and federal level argue that social welfare 
further contributes to the economic crisis by the federal state overspending on 
benefits. These politicians argue for cuts to unemployment insurance, the 
dramatic reductions of benefits in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program and the abolition of compulsory health insurance, otherwise 
known as Obamacare. European states, too, are engaged in these struggles over 
austerity programmes, which pose a direct threat to the European social model 
(Busch, Hermann, Hinrichs, & Schulten, 2013).  
 
The idea of social welfare has been partially relegitimised through the passage of 
Barack Obama’s landmark legislation, the 2010 Affordable Care Act, which, 
among other provisions, extends basic healthcare coverage to 100 million 
Americans. This Act, however, is still being challenged in the courts. In the most 
recent Supreme Court case, King v Burwell, the Justices upheld the funding 
mechanism for the federal subsidy that makes healthcare affordable for 
approximately 7 million Americans. That the expansion of basic healthcare is the 
subject of impassioned popular and policy debate demonstrates the on-going 
contestations about an activist welfare state and the idea of social welfare and 
social solidarity in America.  
 
Since the 1980s, progressive movements have been scattered and disorganised.  
Important movements exist relating to a myriad of particular causes but a multi-
issue, multi-constituent alliance similar to that of the New Deal coalition 
continues to elude the American left. However, we do not ascribe the rolling back 
of the social welfare state to the disorganised left—that is the central project of 
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neoliberalism. While the dismantling of the American welfare state can be traced 
to neoliberal politics, it is also important to note neoliberalism is not totalizing: 
progressives have been able to defend some social programmes, in particular 
Social Security (the state pension) and Medicare (federally subsidised health 
care for adults over the age of 65), which are extremely popular among the 
public. 
 
To provide effective opposition to the neoliberal agenda, and in order to address 
widening social and economic inequalities in American society, the left must 
renew its politics. We contend that the best way to unite the disparate groups of 
the left and re-engage the American public in meaningful debates about equality, 
fairness and the common good is to advance a politics for social welfare. We do 
not think we are overstating the case about the disunited left. For example, the 
recent skirmishes between supporters of the left-wing populist Democratic 
presidential candidate, Bernie Sanders, and Black Lives Matter activists—in 
which the Black Lives Matters protestors disrupted a Sanders event and 
criticized his platform for not addressing racial justice issues—demonstrate that 
we cannot take for granted that those advancing left-wing populist politics and 
those supporters of recognition struggles will naturally and unproblematically 
develop political solidarity for collective action (Florido 10/8/15).  Uniting the 
left to rebuild the welfare state will require a politics that transcends such 
divisions, and there are signs that by working through such disagreements, an 
intersectional left can emerge that has the potential to reshape debates in the 
United States. 
 
We will now turn to discuss the constituent elements of a politics for social 
welfare and the implications this kind of politics might have for community 
development.  
 
 
 
The politics for social welfare 
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As activist-scholars, we are deeply concerned with trying to build a new coalition 
to disrupt neoliberal hegemony and advance the social citizenship rights of the 
most marginalised. This requires a politics that promotes universality in social 
welfare programmes, while also pursuing the expansion of human rights and 
protections for those who have been historically excluded from economic, 
political, and social institutions. We refer to this as a ‘politics for social welfare’— 
ideas and practices that defend and support the expansion of the universal 
redistributive features of the welfare state, whilst simultaneously engaging in 
struggles for the recognition and inclusion of marginalized groups.  We argue 
that a politics that can encompass both redistribution and recognition struggles 
has the best chance of uniting, mobilizing and sustaining the unruly left.  
  
We contend that a politics for social welfare has four constituent elements: a 
theory of justice; an understanding of the history of social reforms; an analysis of 
the state; and an appreciation of its own limitations. We will discuss each of 
these in turn. 
 
A theory of justice 
The starting point for a politics for social welfare is conceiving of both liberty 
and equality. In contemporary American politics, the focus of public debates is 
typically concentrated on individual freedom and negative rights—the right not 
be interfered with by the state (through taxes, regulations and social 
programmes) or by other citizens (Diamond 2000). Indeed, much of the recent 
debate about the Affordable Care Act centres on the legitimacy and authority of 
the state to compel private individuals to have healthcare insurance. American 
life is deeply unequal and this inequality is justified on the basis of preserving 
maximum individual liberty. As T.H. Marshall (1950) and Amartya Sen (2001) 
argue, individual freedom is dependent on equality and social rights. In order for 
individuals to live lives they have reason to value and to participate fully in 
democratic public life, they must have access to social welfare in the form of 
affordable and high quality housing, education and healthcare. Indeed as Ben-
Ishai (2012) persuasively argues, social welfare ‘fosters autonomy’ by securing 
individuals’ social rights. It is through their experiences of social welfare service 
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delivery that individuals and groups learn how to articulate redistribution and 
recognition claims and further advance their social citizenship. The ‘big lie’ of 
neoliberalism is that social welfare undermines individual liberty and fosters 
dependency (Harvey 2007; Hall, Massey and Rustin 2013). Quite the opposite is 
true: social welfare that addresses institutionalised inequalities is what makes 
individual liberty possible and meaningful and it activates rather than 
undermines citizenship.  Freedom from the fear of economic marginalization 
provides the material basis that makes progressive political and social action 
possible. 
 
None of this should be new to left campaigners but this fundamental argument 
defending social welfare is not being made consistently and unapologetically. 
The triumph of neoliberalism is not just in its ruinous economic practices but the 
ways in which it has captured the discourse about justice. Many on the US left 
appear to be embarrassed to talk about social welfare for fear of being labeled 
‘enemies of liberty’ or aligning ourselves with mythical ‘welfare queens’, who are 
generally portrayed as poor Black women (Hancock 2007). Evidence of this can 
be seen in the shift to the right of many social democratic parties on both sides of 
the Atlantic in order to capture swing voters and the ‘centre ground’ in politics 
(Emejulu 2015). By not defending social welfare, the left is robbing itself of the 
language of justice and the ability to form effective coalitions for progressive 
action. The left cannot speak to itself, of itself or to the wider public until it can 
(re)learn that social welfare—which embodies ideals of egalitarianism and 
solidarity—is at the heart of justice. Interestingly, in the left-wing populist 
campaigns of Podemos, Syriza, Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn, we are 
starting to see a renewed commitment to social welfare. 
 
Understanding the limited but necessary nature of social reforms 
As we have demonstrated above, organised pressure from social movements that 
disrupt the social and economic order is how change is made and how 
concessions in the form of institutional reforms are won. Reforms are not 
bequeathed by technocrats but are conceded by institutional actors after defeats 
(Tilly and Tarrow, 2006; Tarrow, 2011). The history of social reforms in the 
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United States shows us that seeking voluntary concessions from the state 
typically does not work and operating on the terms that the state sets is 
oftentimes ineffective. Returning to the example of the Black Lives Matter 
movement, key activists, Brittany Packnett, Johnetta Elzie, DeRay McKesson and 
Samuel Singyangwe, have developed Campaign Zero, a twelve-point policy 
proposal to stop police brutality and extra-judicial police killings 
(http://www.joincampaignzero.org). Through Campaign Zero, activists have 
been able to influence the policy positions of three Democrat candidates seeking 
their party’s presidential nomination: Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders and Martin 
O’Malley.  Organised movements must seek to capture and harness state power 
and state institutions to win reforms for social justice. It remains to be seen 
whether the activists behind Campaign Zero can enact their ambitious and 
important policy agenda.  
 
An analysis of the state in the context of US capitalism 
In order to effectively win reforms, a politics for social welfare must have an 
analysis of the state and state action. Left campaigners must hold two 
contradictory ideas about the state in mind simultaneously. From the rise of the 
carceral state—the institutionalised surveillance, over-policing, mass 
incarceration and state sanctioned violence—which controls the lives of many 
African Americans and Latinos, to the thicket of legislation at the state and local 
levels that regulates women’s bodies and reproductive decision-making, the 
local and national state is a coercive force for many marginalised groups and 
must be transformed (Bumiller, 2008; Alexander, 2012). Further, the state in 
capitalist political economies must be understood as an institution that promotes 
the reproduction of capitalism and unequal social relations by delegitimising the 
demands of labour by holding down wages and benefits in order to allow for 
higher levels of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2005).  However, the state, at the 
local, state and federal levels must undertake various actions to maintain the 
legitimacy of the social order (O’Connor, 2001). This leads us to the second of 
contradictory idea of the state: that the state can also, in a deeply flawed and 
piecemeal fashion, further the cause of social justice through the expansion of 
social reforms. Thus space exists for activists to wrest important concessions 
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from state actors, who must at times concede to these demands in order to 
maintain the legitimacy of the dominant social order.   
 
An example of engaging in such analysis of the state to inform a politics for social 
welfare can be seen in the work of the St. Louis, Missouri based organization 
Missourians Organizing for Reform and Empowerment (MORE).  MORE grounds 
its political work in an analysis of the ways in which state and corporate power 
impact Missouri’s citizens, with a simultaneous focus on taking collective action 
to combat racial injustice and economic inequality (for further details see: 
http://www.organizemo.org). MORE is currently running multiple social justice 
campaigns, including a demand that the city of St. Louis allow non-monetized 
ways for defendants in local courts to pay court fines and costs.  The 
organization refers to this work as their Solidarity Economy campaign.  This 
organizing is particularly salient due to recent findings that Missouri 
municipalities derive a significant amount of their fiscal stability on criminal 
fines and court costs extracted predominantly from residents of colour.  In light 
of the recent rebellion in nearby Ferguson (sparked by the killing of Michael 
Brown by Darren Wilson), MORE’s struggle is a concrete example of having a 
complex understanding of the state and developing a politics for social welfare 
that links redistribution and recognition. 
 
As we have argued above, the state is deeply problematic, but it is the job of left 
campaigners, using the politics for social welfare, to make it work better for the 
most marginalised. As Emejulu (2013: 159) argues, ‘regardless of how the state 
in advanced capitalist countries is seen or experienced, it is important to bear in 
mind that it is not a monolith of either control or protection’. Abandoning the 
state to the right will further shrink the social welfare state and expand the 
repressive apparatuses of the state.  As the work of MORE shows us, a politics for 
social welfare seeks to reclaim the state and bring the state back into our 
conceptions about the nature of justice and how the state can preserve and 
expand social citizenship.   
 
An appreciation of the limitations of a politics for social welfare 
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The very premise of a politics for social welfare will be unpalatable for those 
wanting more revolutionary changes. Whilst we are sympathetic to this, we are 
concerned with how to deal with the actually existing politics as they stand in 
America today. A politics for social welfare is not an end point but a first step to 
opening up dialogue between groups about the good society and social 
solidarity. A politics for social welfare means we are forced to confront the 
realities of who is disproportionately poor and who is most likely to be subject to 
the coercive powers of the state. This politics also forces us to consider what 
kinds of meaningful reforms are necessary in order for people to live the kinds of 
lives they have reason to value. In so doing, we think a politics for social welfare 
places intersectional inequalities—disadvantages derived from the interactions 
of particular categories of difference and social positonality—as a central 
component of left politics. In this way, the left can undertake redistribution 
struggles whilst simultaneously addressing the misrecognition and invisibility 
that many groups experience in everyday life.    
 
Community development as the politics for social welfare? 
Given the above discussion, what is the relationship between community 
development and a politics for social welfare? We think community development 
is uniquely positioned (but not essentially constituted) to be an incubator of a 
politics for social welfare because of the space that community development 
creates, its potential practices in relation to participatory democracy and its 
ability to support the political education of local people. We will discuss each of 
these in turn. 
 
Space: Learning social citizenship  
What is most important about community development, we argue, is the ability 
for different types of people to come together and create a space to articulate 
and take action on the issues that are important to them. In the US, where 
individualism in an important part of social and political life, a community 
development process that fosters social solidarity and collective action is a 
critical and dissenting space whereby local people learn or reaffirm the politics 
and practices for social citizenship. Community development can be a space 
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where citizens learn how to make complex political claims and organise 
collectively to advance both redistribution and recognition social justice 
struggles. Such community development spaces do not happen by accident. 
Critical community development spaces must be intentionally designed to 
encourage debate, develop community leadership, strategise action and endure 
inevitable defeats (Gaventa 2006; Cornwall 2008; Eversole, 2010). A community 
development process that creates this kind of space with and for citizens can 
help to advance a politics for social welfare  
 
Practices: Participatory democracy 
We think critical community development spaces are most likely to flourish 
when they are designed as incubators for participatory democracy.  The ability 
to articulate needs, demands and problems, to learn how undertake deliberative 
dialogue and consensus-based decision-making and how to use collective power 
fosters the sort of environment in which individuals can experience themselves, 
sometimes for the first time, as being active agents exerting control over their 
lives (Polletta 2002; Ransby, 2003; Emejulu 2015).  The practices of 
participatory democracy in community development spaces can offer citizens a 
sense of agency and efficacy and can lead to them demanding similar recognition 
in workplaces, in encounters with the state and in other private and public 
spaces of life. 
 
Purpose: Political education   
Community development is not a neutral activity. It can be deployed in a myriad 
of ways to advance the various agendas of the state, the market, the non-profit 
sector or different kinds of citizens. Whilst we do not believe that there is one 
‘true’ form of community development, we do think that some types of 
community development are better than others because they seek to treat 
community development as a pedagogical process of learning for democracy and 
dissenting citizenship (hooks 2003; Shaw 2008; Learning for Democracy Group 
2008). For community development to effectively contribute to democratic 
public life, it must be designed as an educational endeavor in which people learn 
about themselves, the nature of power and the social world. This kind of political 
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education, which is cultivated in democratic spaces and is geared to developing 
citizenship practices for social solidarity and collective action, is how community 
development might embody a politics for social welfare. 
 
However, we acknowledge that thinking about community development in this 
way is a challenging prospect. A politics for social welfare generates a range of 
dilemmas for community development. For instance, left-wing populists argue 
that a politics for social welfare must engage in a kind of majoritarian strategy 
whereby a given community development process attracts a broader base of 
participants beyond women and people of color to include white working class 
men and women (Scanlon 2001; Atlas 2010). Given that most Americans live 
highly segregated lives, trying to find a way to bring different kinds of groups 
together is a worthy goal for community development. In contrast, those 
concerned with recognition struggles are focused on how women and people of 
colour (and women of colour in particular), who are too often sidelined in 
grassroots politics, can articulate and take action on their complex social justice 
claims with and alongside other groups.  Again, redistribution and recognition 
are not binary opposites, but they are often practised as such in grassroots 
politics. The challenge for community development in operationalising a politics 
for social welfare is puzzling out where and how to begin and with whom, in 
struggles for social justice.  
 
This dispute should not be minimized as it cuts to the heart of our entire 
discussion about democracy, justice and citizenship. We cannot resolve this 
dispute in the abstract but what we can do is offer a few questions that we think 
activists, practitioners and scholars can consider for further action. 
 
 What is the process by which we identify and name particular social 
problems? Whose interpretations of social problems get privileged 
and whose get silenced? 
 
 When we identify social problems, how are particular groups 
constructed as either agents of change or problems to be solved? 
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 How might a community group build strategic alliances in order to 
understand an issue or problem from different perspectives? What is 
to be gained, and whose interests might be challenged, by undertaking 
such a process? 
 
 What role does self-interest play as a motivation for political 
participation and what is its relationship to solidarity across 
categories of difference?  
 
We think these questions represent the sort of inquiry and exploration that will 
be useful to activists, practitioners and scholars. A successful politics for social 
welfare is an educational process that increases participants’ understanding and 
appreciation of the common struggles they share and the distinct oppressions 
that particular groups experience.    
 
Conclusions 
In this article we have attempted to explore some the challenges of community 
development theory and practice in the United States at this uncertain political 
and economic moment. We argued that community development constantly 
battles with an unresolved tension between redistribution and recognition 
struggles for social justice. By outlining a politics for social welfare, we sought to 
offer a strategy for progressive activists to confront these tensions and seek to 
resolve them through critical community development processes. By embracing 
a politics for social welfare, activists can stand up and work for egalitarianism, 
social solidarity and social citizenship. By practicing a politics for social welfare, 
it may be possible to address America’s rapidly rising levels of economic 
inequality whilst simultaneously confronting the injustices of misrecognition and 
disrespect that many groups must also negotiate. Locating a politics for social 
welfare in community development offers the opportunity for activists and 
practitioners to work at the grassroots and engage with the contradictions of the 
state and the competing and complex social justice claims of different groups. 
This is not an easy or straightforward process. However, it is essential for the 
renewal of left politics in America.
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